Practical reasoning as a generalized decision making problem by Amgoud, Leila & Prade, Henri
Practical reasoning as a generalized decision making
problem
Leila Amgoud, Henri Prade
To cite this version:
Leila Amgoud, Henri Prade. Practical reasoning as a generalized decision making problem.
ANNALES DU LAMSADE N8. 2007. <hal-00187521>
HAL Id: hal-00187521
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00187521
Submitted on 14 Nov 2007
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Practical reasoning as a generalized decision making problem
Leila Amgoud
amgoud@irit.fr
Henri Prade
prade@irit.fr
IRIT–CNRS
118, Route de Narbonne
31062 Toulouse cedex 09, FRANCE
Résumé :
La prise de décision, souvent vue comme une
forme de raisonnement sur les actions, a été
considérée de différents points de vue. La théorie
classique de la décision, développée principale-
ment par des économistes, s’est concentrée sur
l’identification et la justification de critères, tels
que l’utilité espérée, pour comparer différentes
alternatives. Cette approche prend en entrée un
ensemble d’actions qui sont atomiques faisables,
et une fonction qui évalue les conséquences de
chaque action. Un trait remarquable mais aussi
une limitation de cette approche est la réduction
du problème de décision à la disponibilité de
deux fonctions : une fonction de distribution de
probabilité et une fonction d’utilité. C’est pourquoi
certains chercheurs en IA ont préconisé le besoin
d’une approche dans laquelle tous les aspects
qui interviennent dans un problème de décision
(tels que les désirs d’un agent, la faisabilité des
actions, etc..) sont explicitement représentés.
Dans cette perspective, des architectures BDI
(Beliefs, Desires, Intentions) ont été proposées.
Elles prennent leur inspiration dans le travail de
philosophes sur ce que les anglo-saxons nomment
practical reasoning ou le "raisonnement pratique".
Le raisonnement pratique traite principalement
de la pertinence au contexte, de la faisabilité et
finalement des intentions retenues et exécutables.
Cependant, ces approches souffrent d’un manque
de formulation claire de règles de décision qui
combinent les considérations ci-dessus pour dé-
cider quelle action exécuter.
Dans cet article, nous montrons que le raison-
nement pratique est un problème de la prise de
décision généralisé. L’idée fondamentale est
qu’au lieu de comparer des actions atomiques, on
compare des ensembles d’actions. L’ensemble
préféré d’actions devient les intentions retenues
par l’un agent.
Le papier présente un cadre unifié qui bénéfi-
cie des avantages des trois approches (décision
classique, architectures BDI, l’idée générales du
raisonnement pratique). Plus précisément, nous
proposons un cadre formel qui prend en entrée
un ensemble de croyances, un ensemble de désirs
conditionnels, et un ensemble de règles présisant
comment des désirs peuvent être réalisés, et
renvoie en sortie un sous-ensemble cohérent de
désirs ainsi que les actions pour les réaliser. De
telles actions s’appellent les intentions. En effet,
nous montrons que ces intentions sont choisies
par l’intermédiaire de quelques règles de décision.
Ainsi, selon que l’agent ait une attitude optimiste
ou pessimiste, l’ensemble des intentions peut ne
pas être le même.
Mots-clés : Raisonnement pratique, Théorie de la
décision, Argumentation
Abstract:
Decision making, often viewed as a form of
reasoning toward action, has been considered from
different points of view. Classical decision theory,
as developed by economists, has focused mainly
on identifying criteria such as expected utility for
comparing different alternatives. The inputs of
this approach are a set of feasible atomic actions,
and a function that assesses the value of their
consequences when the actions are performed in
a given state. One of the main practical limitation
of this approach is the fact that it reduces the
whole decision problem to the availability of two
functions: a probability distribution and a utility
function. This is why some researchers in AI
have advocated the need for a different approach
in which all the aspects that may be involved
in a decision problem (such as the desires of an
agent, the feasibility of actions, etc) are explicitly
represented. Hence, BDI architectures have been
developed. They take their inspiration in the work
of philosophers who have advocated practical
reasoning. Practical reasoning mainly deals with
the adoption, filling in, and reconsideration of
intentions. However, these approaches suffer from
a lack of a clear formulation of decision rules that
combine the above qualitative concepts to decide
which action to perform.
In this paper, we argue that practical reason-
ing is a generalized decision making problem.
The basic idea is that instead of comparing atomic
actions, one has to compare sets of actions. The
preferred set of actions becomes the intentions of
the agent. The paper presents a unified setting
that benefits from the advantages of the three
above-mentioned approaches (classical decision,
15
BDI, practical reasoning). More precisely, we
propose a formal framework that takes as input a
set of beliefs, a set of conditional desires, and a
set of rules stating how desires can be achieved,
and returns a consistent subset of desires as well
as ways/actions for achieving them. Such actions
are called intentions. Indeed, we show that these
intentions are generated via some decision rules.
Thus, depending on whether the agent has an
optimistic or a pessimistic attitude, the set of
intentions may not be the same.
Keywords: Practical reasoning, Decision making,
Argumentation theory
1 Introduction
Decision making, often viewed as a form
of reasoning toward action, has raised
the interest of many scholars including
philosophers, economists, psychologists,
and computer scientists for a long time.
Any decision problem amounts to select
the best option(s) among different alterna-
tives.
The decision problem has been consid-
ered from different points of view. Clas-
sical decision theory, as developed by
economists, has focused mainly on iden-
tifying criteria for comparing different al-
ternatives. The inputs of this approach
are a set of feasible actions, and a func-
tion that assesses the value of their conse-
quences when the actions are performed in
a given state. The output is a preference
relation between actions. A decision cri-
terion, such as the classical expected util-
ity [11], should then be justified on the
basis of a set of postulates to which the
preference relation between action should
obey. Note that such an approach consid-
ers a group of candidate actions as a whole
rather than focusing on a candidate action
individually. Moreover, the candidate ac-
tions are supposed to be feasible.
More recently, some researchers in AI
have advocated the need for a new ap-
proach in which the different aspects that
may be involved in a decision problem
(such as the goals of the agent, the feasi-
bility of an action, its consequences, the
conflicts between goals, the alternative
plans for achieving the same goal, etc) can
be handled. In [5, 6], it has been argued
that this can be done by representing the
cognitive states, namely agent’s beliefs,
desires and intentions (thus the so-called
BDI architecture). The decision problem
is then to select among the conflicting
desires a consistent and feasible subset
that will constitute the intentions. The
above line of research takes its inspiration
in the work of philosophers who have ad-
vocated practical reasoning [10]. Practical
reasoning mainly deals with the adoption,
filling in, and reconsideration of intentions
and plans. It follows two main steps: 1)
deliberation, in which an agent decides
what state of affairs it wants to achieve
–that is, its desires; and (2) means-ends
reasoning, in which an agent devises plans
for achieving these desires.
In this paper, we argue that practical
reasoning is a generalized decision mak-
ing problem. The basic idea is that instead
of comparing atomic actions, one has
to compare sets of coherent plans (i.e.
plans that can be achieved together) that
will achieve the desires computed at the
deliberation step. The preferred set of
plans becomes the intentions of the agent.
The paper presents a formal framework
for practical reasoning that works in three
steps: at the first step one computes,
from a set of conditional desires, a set
of arguments supporting them, and a
conflict relation among these arguments,
a set of what is called justified desires.
These desires can be pursued provided
that they have plans for achieving them.
The second step computes sets of plans
that can are achievable together. The input
is the set of conditional desires, a set of
plans (whose structure and origin are not
discussed here), a function specifying
for each conditional desire the plans for
achieving it, and finally a set of conflicting
plans. The framework returns extensions
Practical reasoning as a generalized decision making problem___________________________________________________________________________
16
of plans. An extension is a set of plans that
can be achieved together. Once, these sets
identified, one applies decision making
techniques for ordering these extensions.
The idea is to prefer the set that achieves
the most important desires returned at the
deliberation level.
The paper is organized as follows: we start
by presenting our abstract framework of
practical reasoning, then we illustrate it on
an example. Then we compare our work
with existing works in the literature. The
last section is devoted to some concluding
remarks and perspectives.
2 General framework for prac-
tical reasoning
Practical reasoning is the reasoning toward
action. It follows three main steps:
1. Generating desires to be achieved,
called also deliberation
2. Generating plans for achieving those
desires, called means-end reasoning
3. Selecting the intentions to be pursued
by the agent. The intentions are the
plans that will be performed for reach-
ing the generated desires.
In what follows, L will denote a logical
language. From L, we distinguish a finite
set D of potential conditional desires.
Desires will be denotes by d1, . . . , dn.
Some desires may be more important
than others. This is captured by a partial
preordering ºd on D, thus ºd ⊆ D × D.
Similarly, from L, different arguments
can be built. An argument may provide a
reason of generating or adopting a given
desire. Let A denote the set of these
arguments whose structure and origin are
not known.
Since knowledge bases may be inconsis-
tent, arguments may be conflicting too.
These conflicts are captured by a binary
relation Ra ⊆ A × A.
Let us define a function Fd that returns for
each desire di in D the set of arguments
supporting it. Thus,
Fd : D → 2A
for instance, Fd(d1) = {a1, . . . , an} with{a1, . . . , an} ⊆ A. Note that some desires
may not be supported by arguments. Such
desires will not be considered as inten-
tions. We assume that an argument cannot
support two or more desires at the same
time. Formally: ∀di, dj , Fd(di) ∩ Fd(dj)
= ∅.
We assume that we have a set P =
{p1, . . . , pm} of plans. A plan is a way of
achieving a desire. The structure and the
origin of the plans are left unknown.
Plans are related to the desires they achieve
by the following function
Fp : D → 2P .
Each plan is assumed to achieve at least
one desire, i.e. ∀di, dj ∈ D,Fp(d)∩Fp(d′)
= ∅.
It is very common that a given plan may
not be achievable because, for instance, it
has a consequence that contradicts the de-
sire it wants to achieve. It is also possible
that two or more plans cannot be achiev-
able at the same time since, for instance
they yield to conflicting situations. Such
conflicts among elements of P are given
by a set Rp ⊆ 2P . We assume that only
minimal conflicts are given in Rp, this
means that @S, S ′ ∈ RP such that S ⊆ S ′.
Let us consider the following example.
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Example 1 Let D = {d1, d2, d3}, A ={a1, a2, a3, a4}, Ra = {(a1, a2), (a2, a3)},Fd(d1) = {a3}, Fd(d2) = {a4}, Fd(d3)
= ∅, P = {p1, p2, p3}, Fp(d1) = {p1},
Fp(d2) = {p2}, Fp(d3) = {p3}, and Rp =
{{p2}, {p1, p3}}.
2.1 A general framework for delibera-
tion
This section aims at generating the desires
that can be pursued by the agent (in case
they are feasible, i.e. they have plans). As
shown in the above illustrative example,
one may have conditional desires that de-
pend on some beliefs. The idea is to check
whether the conditions of these desires
hold in the current state of the world. In
the above example, both desires d1 and d2
are generated since their conditions hold.
In our general framework, we suppose that
an argument is built for supporting a desire
as soon as the conditions on which it de-
pends hold. However, since a knowledge
base may be inconsistent, i.e. the condition
may hold but, at the same time there is an
information which contradicts it, counter-
arguments can be built. Thus, the gener-
ated desires, or the outcome of the delib-
eration step, is the result of a simple argu-
mentation system defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Argumentation system)
An argumentation system for generating
desires to be pursued in a pair 〈A,Ra〉.
In [7], different acceptability semantics
have been introduced for computing the
status of arguments. These are based on
two basic concepts, defence and conflict-
free, defined as follows:
Definition 2 (Defence/conflict-free) Let
S ⊆ A.
• S defends an argument a iff each ar-
gument that defeats a is defeated in the
sense of Ra by some argument in S.
• S is conflict-free iff there exist no a, a′
in S such that aRa a′.
Definition 3 (Acceptability semantics)
Let S be a conflict-free set of arguments,
and let T : 2A → 2A be a function such
that T (S) = {a | S defends a}.
• S is a complete extension iff S =
T (S).
• S is a preferred extension iff S is a
maximal (w.r.t set ⊆) complete exten-
sion.
• S is a grounded extension iff it is the
smallest (w.r.t set ⊆) complete exten-
sion.
Let E1, . . . , Ex denote the different exten-
sions under a given semantics.
Note that there is only one grounded ex-
tension. It contains all the arguments that
are not defeated, and those arguments that
are defended directly or indirectly by non-
defeated arguments.
Now that the acceptability semantics de-
fined, we are ready to define the status of
any argument.
Definition 4 (Argument status) Let
〈A,Ra〉 be an argumentation system, andE1, . . . , Ex its extensions under a given
semantics. Let a ∈ A.
1. a is accepted iff a ∈ Ei, ∀Ei with i =
1, . . . , x.
2. a is rejected iff @Ei such that a ∈ Ei.
3. a is undecided iff a is neither accepted
nor rejected. This means that a is in
some extensions and not in others.
On the basis of the status of each argu-
ment, it is now possible to compute the set
Practical reasoning as a generalized decision making problem___________________________________________________________________________
18
of desires that are supposed to be justified
in the current state of the world. As said
before, this will represent the outcome of
the deliberation step.
Definition 5 (Justified desires) Let D be
a set of potential desires. The justified
desires are gathered in the set Output =
{di ∈ D such that ∃a ∈ A, a is accepted,
and a ∈ Fd(di)}.
Example 2 (Example 1 continued) Let
D = {d1, d2, d3}, A = {a1, a2, a3, a4},Ra = {(a1, a2), (a2, a3)}, Fd(d1) = {a3},Fd(d2) = {a4}, Fd(d3) = ∅. In this ex-
ample, the argumentation system 〈A,Ra〉
returns only one grounded extension
{a1, a3, a4}. Thus, the output of the delib-
eration is {d1, d2}. The desire d3 is not
supported by arguments, thus there is no
reason to generate this desire.
Note that the generated desires will not
necessarily be pursued by an agent. They
should also be feasible.
2.2 A general framework for means-
end reasoning
The second step of practical reasoning
consists of looking for plans to achieve de-
sires. Since an agent may have several
desires at the same time, then it needs to
know not only which desire is achievable,
but also which subsets of desires can be
achieved together. In what follows, we
propose an abstract framework that returns
extensions of plans, i.e. sets of coher-
ent plans, and thus subsets of desires that
can be pursued at the same time. This
framework takes as input the following el-
ements: D, P , Fp, and Rp.
Definition 6 A framework for generating
feasible plans is a pair 〈P ,Rp〉.
Here again, we are looking for groups of
plans that are achievable together. This
means that the plans should not be con-
flicting. Thus, the extensions should be
conflict-free:
Definition 7 (Conflict-free) Let S ⊆P . S
is conflict-free iff @ S ′ ⊆ S, such that S ′ ∈
Rp.
Definition 8 (Extension of plans) Let S
⊆ P . S is an extension iff:
• S is conflict-free
• S is maximal for set inclusion among
subsets of P that satisfies the first con-
dition.
S1, . . . ,Sn will denote the different exten-
sions of plans.
As for arguments, it also possible to define
the status of each plan as follows:
Definition 9 (Status of plans) Let p ⊆ P .
• p is feasible iff ∃Si such that p ∈ Si
• p is unachievable iff @Si such that p ∈Si
• p is universally feasible iff ∀Si, p ∈ Si.
This means that such a plan is feasible
with other plans.
On the basis of the status of plans, one can
define the status of each desire. Four cases
are distinguished:
Definition 10 (Status of desires) Let d ⊆
D.
• d is achievable iff ∃p ∈ Fp(d) such
that p is feasible
____________________________________________________________________________Annales du LAMSADE N°8
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• d is unachievable iff ∀p ∈ Fp(d), p is
unachievable
• d is universally feasible iff ∃p ∈ Fp(d)
such that p is universally feasible
• d is universally accepted iff ∀p ∈
Fp(d), p is universally feasible
The desires achieved by each extension are
returned by a function defined as follows:
Definition 11 Let Si be an extension of the
framework 〈P ,Rp〉.
Desires(Si) = {dj ∈ D s.t. ∃p ∈ Si and
Fp(dj) = p}.
Example 3 (Example 1 continued) P =
{p1, p2, p3}, Fp(d1) = {p1}, Fp(d2)
= {p2}, Fp(d3) = {p3}, and Rp =
{{p2}, {p1, p3}}.
The set Rp means that the plan p2 is not
achievable, and that the two plans p1, and
p3 cannot be achieved together. Thus,
the system 〈P ,Rp〉 will return two exten-
sions: S1 = {p1}, and S2 = {p3}, with
Desires(S1) = {d1} and Desires(S2) ={d3}.
It is clear that the desire d2 is unachiev-
able, and the two desires d1, d3 cannot
be pursued at the same time. The agent
should select only one of them.
2.3 Selecting intentions
In the previous section, we have proposed
a framework that returns extensions of
plans, i.e. plans that may co-exist together.
However, as shown before, several exten-
sions may exist at the same time. One
needs to select the one that will constitute
the intentions of the agent. A preordering
. on the set {S1, . . . ,Sn} is then needed.
This is a decision making problem. This
latter amounts to defining a pre-ordering,
usually a complete one, on a set of possible
alternatives, on the basis of the different
consequences of each alternative. In [1],
it has been shown that argumentation can
be used for defining such a pre-ordering.
The idea is to construct arguments in
favor of and against each alternative,
to evaluate such arguments, and finally
to apply some principle for comparing
pairs of alternatives on the basis of the
quality or strength of their arguments.
In that framework, atomic actions are
ordered. In what follows, we will extend
the framework to the case of sets of plans,
i.e. instead of ordering atomic actions, we
will define a preordering on the set E =
{S1, . . . ,Sn}.
The main ingredients that are involved in
the definition of an argumentation-based
decision framework are the following:
Definition 12 (Decision framework) An
argumentation-based decision framework
is a tuple 〈E , Ae, ºe〉 where:
• E is the set of possible alternatives.
• Ae is a set of arguments support-
ing/attacking elements of E .
• ºe is a (partial or complete) pre-
ordering on Ae.
The output is a preordering . on E . Si .Sj
means that the extension Si is preferred to
the extension Sj .
Once the relation . is identified, one can
compute the intentions of an agent. The
intentions are the set of plans belonging to
the most preferred extension w.r.t. ., and
which achieve generated desires.
Definition 13 (The intentions) The set of
intentions is {pi ∈ Sj| pi ∈ Fp(d), d ∈
Output, and ∀Sk, Sj . Sk}.
Practical reasoning as a generalized decision making problem___________________________________________________________________________
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Arguments. A decision may have argu-
ments in its favor (called PROS), and ar-
guments against it (called CONS). Argu-
ments PROS point out the existence of
good consequences for a given decision. In
our application, an argument PRO an ex-
tension Si points out the fact it achieves a
generated desire, i.e. an element of the set
Output. Formally:
Definition 14 (Arguments PROS) Let
Si ∈ E . An argument in favor of, or PRO,
the extension Si is a triple A = 〈pj,Si, dk〉
such that pj ∈ Si, pj ∈ Fp(dk), and dk ∈
Output.
Let ArgP be the set of all such arguments
that can built.
Note that there are as many arguments as
plans to carry out the same desire. Ar-
guments CONS highlight the existence of
bad consequences for a given decision, or
the absence of good ones. Arguments
CONS are defined by exhibiting a gener-
ated desire that is not achieved by the ex-
tension. Formally:
Definition 15 (Arguments CONS) Let
Si ∈ E . An argument against, or CONS,
the extension Si is a pair A = 〈Si, dk〉
such that @pj ∈ Si, pj ∈ Fp(dk), and dk ∈
Output.
Let ArgC be the set of all such arguments
that can built.
Note that some arguments may be stronger
than others. For instance, an argument
A = 〈pj,Si, dk〉 in favor of the extensionSi may be preferred to an argument B =〈p′j,Si, dl〉 if the desire dk is preferred to
the desire dl. In this case, the preference
relation ºe is based on a preference rela-
tion ºd between the potential desires ofD. The relation ºe can also be defined
on the basis of the plans themselves. For
instance, one may prefer the argument A
over the argument B if the cost of pj is
lower than the cost of the plan p′j .
Some decision criteria. Different criteria
for defining the preordering . on E can be
defined. In what follows, we will present
some examples borrowed from [1], and
adapted to our application, i.e. ordering
sets of plans.
In what follows, GoalsX(Si) be a function
that returns for a given decision or exten-
sion Si, all the desires for which there ex-
ists an argument of type X (i.e. PROS or
CONS) with conclusion Si.
Let Si, Sj ∈ E .
Si .1 Sj iff GoalsP (Si) 6= ∅, and
GoalsP (Sj) = ∅ (1)
The above criterion prefers the extension
that achieves generated desires. This can
be refined as follows:
Si .2 Sj iff GoalsP (Si) ⊃ GoalsP (Sj) (2)
The above criterion prefers the extension
that achieves more generated desires. This
partial preorder can be further refined into
a complete preorder as follows:
Si .3 Sj iff |GoalsP (Si)| > |GoalsP (Sj)|
(3)
3 Illustrative example
Let us consider an agent who has the two
following conditional desires:
1. To go on a journey to central Africa if
he is in holidays. (hol → jca)
2. To finish a publication if there is a
deadline of a conference. (conf →
fp)
In addition to the desires, the agent is
supposed to have beliefs on the way of
achieving a given desire:
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
t ∧ vac → jca
w → fp
ag → t
fr → t
hop → vac
dr → vac
with: t = “to get the tickets”, vac =
“to be vaccinated”, w = “to work”, ag
= “to go to the agency”, fr = “to have a
friend who may bring the tickets”, hop =
“to go to the hospital”, dr = “to go to a
doctor”.
For example, the rule t ∧ vac → jca
means that the agent believes that if he
gets tickets and he is vaccinated then he
will be able to go on a journey in central
Africa. The rule w → fp expresses that
the agent believes that if he works then
he will be able to finish his paper. To
get tickets, the agent can either visit an
agency or ask a friend of him to get them.
Similarly, to be vaccinated, the agent has
the choice between going to a doctor or
going to the hospital. In these two last
cases, the agent has two ways to achieve
the same desire.
An agent may have also another kind of
beliefs representing integrity constraints
and facts. In our example, we have:
hol
conf
w → ¬ag
w → ¬hop
The two latter rules mean that the agent
believes that if he works, he can neither
visit an agency nor go to a doctor. In this
example, the two conditional desires jca
and fp are justified in the current state of
the world since the they depend on beliefs
(respectively hol and conf ) that are true.
Moreover, both desires have at least a plan
for achieving them. However, some ways
of achieving the desires are conflicting.
<{t, vac}, jca> <{t, vac}, jca>
<{ag}, t> <{dr}, vac>
<{}, dr><{}, ag>
<{ag}, t> <{hop}, vac>
g3
<{}, hop>
<{hop}, vac>
<{}, hop>
<{fr}, t>
<{}, fr>
<{fr}, t>
<{}, fr>
<{dr}, vac>
<{}, dr>
g2
g4
<{t, vac}, jca><{t, vac}, jca>
<{}, ag>
g1
<{w}, fp>
<{}, w>
g5
Figure 1: Complete plans
Of course, it would be ideal if all the de-
sires can become intentions. As our exam-
ple illustrates, this may not always be the
case. We will answer the following ques-
tions: which desires will be pursued by the
agent and with which plans?
In this example, we have two arguments in
favor of the conditional desires jca and fp.
Let A = 〈{hol, hol → jca}, jca〉 and B
= 〈{conf, conf → fp}, fp〉. These argu-
ments are not defeated at all, thus they be-
long to the grounded extension of the argu-
mentation system. Consequently, Output
= {jca, fp}.
there are four complete plans (g1, g2, g3,
g4) for the desire ‘going on a journey to
central africa’ and exactly one complete
plan g5 for the desire ‘finishing the paper’.
These are given in figure 1. Moreover, g5
attacks g1, g2 and g3. Thus, there are ex-
actly two extensions:
• S1 = {g1, g2, g3, g4}
• S2 = {g4, g5}
The extension S1 is supported by four ar-
guments:
• A1 = 〈g1,S1, jca〉
• A2 = 〈g2,S1, jca〉
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• A3 = 〈g3,S1, jca〉
• A4 = 〈g4,S1, jca〉
The four arguments exhibits the same de-
sire jca. However, the extension S2 is sup-
ported by only two arguments:
• B1 = 〈g4,S1, jca〉
• B2 = 〈g5,S1, fp〉
However, the two arguments refer to two
different desires. According to crite-
rion (2), it is clear that S2 is preferred
to S1 since GoalsP (S2) ⊃ GoalsP (S1),
knowing that GoalsP (S1) = {jca}, and
GoalsP (S1) = {jca, fp}. The inten-
sions to be pursued by the agent are then
{g4, g5}.
4 Related works
Recently, a number of attempts have been
made to use formal models of argumen-
tation as a basis for practical reasoning.
Some of these models (e.g. [2, 3, 8]) are
instantiations of the abstract argumenta-
tion framework of Dung [7]. Others (e.g.
[9, 12]) are based on an encoding of argu-
mentative reasoning in logic programs. Fi-
nally, there are frameworks based on em-
pirical approaches to practical reasoning
and persuasion (e.g. [4, 13]). Our frame-
work builds on the former, and is therefore
a contribution towards formalising practi-
cal reasoning using abstract argumentation
systems.
Amgoud [2] presented an argumentation
framework for generating consistent plans
from a given set of desires and planning
rules. This was later extended with ar-
gumentation frameworks that generate the
desires themselves (see below).
Amgoud and Kaci [3] have a notion of
“conditional rule”, which is meant to gen-
erate desires from beliefs. Our frame-
work is more general in the sense that we
don’t specify how arguments are built from
bases. Indeed, the structure and the origin
of the arguments are left unknown and can
be instantiated with any logic. Moreover,
in that work it is not clear how intentions
are chosen.
Hulstijn and van der Torre [8], on the other
hand, have a notion of “desire rule”, which
contains only desires in the consequent.
But their approach is still problematic. It
requires that the selected goals are sup-
ported by goal trees which contain both de-
sire rules and belief rules that are deduc-
tively consistent. This consistent deduc-
tive closure again does not distinguish be-
tween desire literals and belief literals (see
Proposition 2 in [8]). This means that one
cannot both believe ¬p and desire p. Here
again, the selection of intention is left un-
solved.
5 Conclusion
This paper has presented the first general
and abstract framework for practical rea-
soning. It shows that this latter generalizes
the decision making problem.
We presented a formal model for reason-
ing about desires (generating desires and
plans for achieving them) based on argu-
mentation theory. We adapted the notions
of attack and preference among arguments
in order to capture the differences in argu-
ing about desires and plans.
One of the main advantages of our frame-
work is that, being grounded in argumen-
tation, it lends itself naturally to facili-
tating dialogues about desires and plans.
Indeed, we are currently extending our
framework with dialogue game protocols
in order to facilitate negotiation and per-
suasion among agents. Another interesting
area of future work is investigating the re-
lationship between our framework and ax-
iomatic approaches to BDI agents.
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